Lightweight Security Protocol for WiSense based Wireless Sensor Network by Dasgupta, Aronee et al.
International Journal of Computer Applications (0975 – 8887) 
Volume 145 – No.3, July 2016 
6 
Lightweight Security Protocol for WiSense based 
Wireless Sensor Network 
Sahilkumar 
Chakraborty 
Department of Electronics 
and Communication 
RV College of Engineering 
Bangalore, India 
 
 
Astha Nachrani 
Department of Computer 
Science 
and Engineering 
RV College of 
Engineering 
Bangalore, India 
 
 
Aronee Dasgupta 
Department of 
Telecommunication 
RV College of 
Engineering 
Bangalore, India 
 
 
Pritam Gajkumar 
Shah, PhD 
Department of Computer 
Science 
and Engineering 
RV College of 
Engineering 
Bangalore, India 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
Wireless Sensor Networks have emerged as one of the leading 
technologies. These networks are designed to monitor crucial 
environmental parameters of humidity, temperature, wind 
speed, soil moisture content, UV index, sound, etc. and then 
transfer the required information to the base station. However, 
security remains the key challenge of such networks as critical 
data is being transferred. Most sensor nodes currently 
deployed have constraints on memory and processing power 
and hence operate without an efficient security protocol. 
Hereby a protocol which is lightweight and is secure for 
wireless sensor applications is proposed.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Due to developments in analogue and digital technologies 
many corporations have developed low power and low cost 
wireless sensor nodes which are used in sensing of 
environmental parameters [1]. Sensor nodes process the 
information gathered and then transmit it to the coordinator or 
to other slave nodes to provide intelligence for better 
understanding of the environment (depending upon the 
network topology) [2]. Applications include perimeter 
monitoring, vehicle emission monitoring, defence monitoring 
(in reconnaissance scenarios), etc. Openness of the channel 
and low physical protection of the channel poses a security 
risk. 
Current encryption standards have been designed for high 
performance devices and are taxing on the sensors which have 
low computation capabilities and have low available 
bandwidth. More so, security protocols, developed for ad hoc 
networks cannot be applied directly for sensor networks due 
to difference in their architecture design. Sensor networks are 
self-organizing, dynamic, with peer to peer data transmission 
capabilities sensor networks on the other hand have a well-
defined topology with a central base station to which all the 
data is relayed. Employing traditional encryption algorithms 
in the sensor would cause extra bits to be processed and 
transmitted and due to the large processing delay incurred 
jitter and lag would occur throughout the network [3]. There is 
a paramount need for developing a robust encryption which 
does not required heavy cryptography processes but still 
provides sufficient security for the required application. 
 
Implementing a robust yet lightweight algorithm is needed not 
just in the central base station but also the sensor nodes. There 
was a controversy regarding the implementation of AES 
algorithm for encryption and decryption in sensor networks 
utilizing the ZigBee protocol because AES needs high 
processing power and memory usage especially in nodes 
containing low amounts of available RAM [4]. Also the 
management and modification of the encryption keys in the 
sensor nodes is a major consideration as nodes are spatially 
distributed and remain away from direct human. The proposed 
protocol uses a combination of substitution using a S-Box 
matrix and an XOR operation with a key to provide a 
reasonable level of security for low performance nodes. 
2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
Fig. 1.  Wireless Sensor Network Architecture 
Fig.1 [5] shows a typical wireless sensor network architecture 
consisting of various sensor nodes connected to the sink node. 
The sink can be controlled by a remote terminal over the 
Internet. Sensor networks comprise many nodes spatially 
distributed over a large area. Sensor nodes are designed to 
work for long durations of time (possibly stretching into 
months) to collect, analyse and return data to base station [5]. 
The sensor network may have the nodes designed as passive 
or active. In a passive node the base station listens to the node 
(and the node transmits the data back to the base station) only 
for a fixed duration in a time interval. This reduces the battery 
consumption of the node as the node can run in idle or low-
power mode when the base station is not listening. A duty 
cycle is defined for the passive node sensor network. A 
smaller duty cycle helps in achieving better energy efficiency 
in the sensor network which is desirable [6]. In an active node 
the base station continuously listens to the node and the node 
processes, analyses and returns the data gathered back to the 
base station. 
In mobile sensor network each node needs to know each its 
location either through GPS or any other relative positioning 
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algorithm. For ad-hoc fixed networks network information has 
to be dynamically updated in real time as sensor nodes may 
fail or be added to the network. The transmission protocols 
and software design have to be constructed keeping in mind 
the effects of shallow fading, number of links, communication 
length, mode of propagation and the minimum acceptable 
quality of service. Since the sensor nodes are highly 
susceptible to environmental parameters (like wind speed, 
humidity, rain, etc.) redundancy in the number of nodes have 
to be provided so that the network doesn’t go offline. 
Security protocols have to be built into the initial design of the 
nodes and not as a retrofit as most nodes operate in hostile 
conditions and it is imperative their presence remains 
undetected. They are limited in their available energy (around 
20 – 30 joules). Since data is arriving from large number of 
sources the incoming data needs to be combined with the local 
information so that the resulting information can be passed on 
to the central node. Dissemination of the large amounts of 
data collected and processed needs the network to have to low 
amounts of transmission latency. Security protocols have to be 
designed which protects the network from spoofing and 
intrusion. 
2.1 WiSense Node Architecture 
 
Fig. 2.  WiSense Node –courtesy WiSense [7] 
Fig. 2 shows the WiSense WSN1101L [7] based wireless 
mesh node. It consists of the microcontroller module 
(MSP430G2955) and the radio module (CC1101). The radio 
module has an antenna for receiving and transmitting the data. 
The MSP430G2955 is an ultra-low power microcontroller 
from TI with 56 KB of flash memory and 4 KB static ram 
memory. The standby current can reach as low as 1 micro 
ampere. Operating voltage of the microcontroller lies between 
1.8 V – 3.6 V. The module has an on-chip 10-bit ADC 
channels. Peripheral support is provided on the module in the 
form of UAR, I2C and SPI. There is a SPI and GPIO interface 
to the radio module and UART or I2C or SPI or GPIO 
interface to sensors. An on-board 32KHz crystal provides the 
clock. The radio module (CC11011) operates below the 1 
GHz frequency. It is a low cost transceiver suitable for remote 
sensing applications. The frequency range in which it operates 
lies in the 300-348 MHz, 387-464 MHz and 779-928 MHz 
bands [8]. On-off keying (OOK) and flexible (Amplitude-shift 
keying) ASK shaping are the two modulation schemes 
supported for RF transmission and receiving. Data rates range 
from 0.6 to 600 kbps. The on-board antenna is an omni 
directional whip antenna, having a length of 117 mm. An on-
board high accuracy 26 MHz crystal provides the clock for the 
circuit. 
2.2 Issues in Implementing AES in Sensor 
Nodes 
Symmetric techniques have the problem of key agreement, 
issues regarding the scalability of keys and do not provide 
nonrepudiation [9]. AES is considered slow and requires a lot 
of memory for the storing the lookup tables. AES has higher 
mean values for energy-latency product, the energy per bit for 
encryption process is around 151nJ/bit for 128 bit AES 
encryption. [10]. Even if the AES encryption takes only 11 
cycles the full program with data retrieval, encryption and 
calculation takes a full 704 clock according to Hodjat. The 
decryption process was found to take 20-30% more energy 
than the decryption process. Also symmetric techniques like 
AES, are highly architecture dependent [11]. 
2.3 Limitations in implementing AES in 
WiSense Nodes 
The WiSense [7] node under consideration, is built on the TI 
MSP430G2955 a 16-bit RISC architecture based 
microcontroller [12]. There exist serious limitations in 
implementing symmetric encryption algorithms in 16-bit 
microcontrollers like the MSP430. Most of these algorithms 
are adapted for 32-bit processors, however the node under 
consideration is a 16-bit microcontroller. Rijndael cipher 
block have been optimized for 32-bit processors but these 
optimizations cannot be applied to the TI MSP430 due to its 
limited instruction set. Also these optimizations even if 
applied will take majority of the memory available from the 
node. The MSP430 has a simple but limited instruction set. 
The majority of register operations take up 1 cycle, but 
accessing the actual memory is costly and takes up to 3 cycles. 
Considering an example if standard 128-bit implementation of 
AES in TelosB note [13] had been implemented, it would take 
1.994 ms for encryption and a further 2.365 ms for decryption 
[14]. 
3. NETWORK ARCHITECTURE 
3.1 WiSense Network  
A multihop mesh WiSense Sensor-Actuator Network 
(WISAN) has been considered which consists of 25 nodes 
with total of 72 sensors operating at 2405Mhz with a 
transmission power of 5 dbm. The sensor nodes collect data 
regarding temperature, voltage and pressure. The coordinator 
node has a MAC ID of 0xDEADBEEFFEEDDADD [15]. 
Table 1 shows the sensor information concerning the last and 
final update time tags. Table 2 shows the location and address 
of the nodes as they are spatially distributed in the 
environment. The node is based on the TI MSP430G2955 
microcontroller. The module consists of two PCB’s. One PCB 
hosts the microcontroller while the other hosts the CC1101 
radio. The microcontroller PCB has 56 KB of flash, 4 KB of 
SRAM with a standby current (in LMP3) as low as 1 micro 
amp. It has as an optional on board serial to USB interface (to 
provide both power and serial connectivity). It has peripheral 
support in the form of SPI/I2C/UART with a 32 kHz crystal 
as a real-time clock [7]. 
3.2 WiSense Network  
The firmware elements consist of the Reduced Function 
Device (RFD), Full Function Device (FFD), Coordinator and 
the Gateway [16]. Reduced Function Device (RFD) is 
essentially a mote that has sensors and firmware code for 
remote connectivity and local processing. The available sensor 
information is relayed to the FFD from the RFD. Full 
Function Device (FFD) is similar to a RFD, but it also helps 
as an intermediate relay node. A RFD sends information to a 
neighbouring FFD, which deals with routing that information 
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to its neighbouring FFDs. This chain proceeds until the 
coordinator is reached. The PAN coordinator is the master 
device and the control point in the system. Various systems 
can exist in the same area, however, there will be one and only 
coordinator for every system. RFDs and FFDs partner with 
the coordinator when they join that specific system. The 
coordinator allocates every hub a PAN address that is 
legitimate inside the system. Messages from reduced and full 
function devices are sent to the gateway. Control messages are 
prepared by the coordinator however sensor information is 
generally sent to gateway the for transmission towards 
LAN/WAN. 
4. IMPLEMENTATION 
In the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) with Cipher 
Block Chains, the outcome of encryption of the first block is 
used to encrypt the next. The process is continued iteratively. 
Such a design calls for a feedback. Each round of encryption 
uses the following processes viz. SubBytes, ShiftRows, 
MixColumns and AddRoundKey [17]. There are in total ten 
rounds with the last round skipping the MixColumns step. At 
the receiver end a mathematical inverse of each step is done, 
however, the order is reversed. Block size of 128 bits is 
considered. Other than the SubBytes step all the other three 
steps are linear. In the only nonlinear step (SubBytes) the 
Galois inverse is calculated of an 8-bit number which itself 
lies in the Galois Field GF (28). Despite being faster the look 
up table method suffers from one critical disadvantage: it 
occupies 256 bytes of storage not considering the memory 
needed for addressing and storing the results. [18]. Each 16 
bytes in the block needs to processed separately and in 
parallel for the substation. However, for practical applications 
this would cause to 16 copies of the S-Box to be present for a 
single round itself and for a full pipeline implementation, 160 
copies of the S-Box table for the entire encryption process 
[17]. A total of 40960 bytes of memory would be needed for 
the SubBytes step alone, which is expensive in sensor nodes. 
4.1 Proposed Protocol  
 
Fig. 3.  AES S-Box [19] 
Fig. 3 [19] shows an AES S-Box. Every sensor node in the 
network will have an inbuilt 16*16 S-Box [20] which would 
occupy a total of 2 kilobits of flash memory. Now consider 
two nodes that wish to communicate with each other for 
sending and receiving humidity, temperature, wind speed, soil 
moisture content, UV index or sound values etc., this value to 
be sent is first substituted with the corresponding element in 
the 16*16 S-Box by the method of substitution. The 
substituted value is then EX-ORed with a key, which can be - 
a) hour/minute/second value in the timestamp b) the node 
name c) last two bits of its MAC address. At the receiver end 
the received data is again first EX-ORed with the key then 
mapping is done with the help of the S-Box to arrive at the 
unencrypted value. Only the first 2 digits of the MAC address, 
timestamp, or the node name, is considered as the key to save 
on memory. If timestamp was to be used as the key then an 
extra flag should be transmitted to specify whether the hours, 
mins or seconds is considered as the time stamp value. The 
above proposed security protocol consumes the least memory 
of little more 2 Kilobits (along with some memory needed for 
the runtime code).  
4.2 Example 
 
Fig. 4. High level Block Diagram of the proposed 
encryption and decryption process 
Fig. 4 shows the high-level implementation of the proposed 
encryption and decryption process with a block diagram. The 
time-stamp, node name, or the MAC address can also be used 
as the key for the Ex-OR operation. If the time-stamp is to be 
considered as the key then, an additional flag of 2-bit length is 
needed to specify whether hours, minutes or seconds is being 
used as the time-stamp value. This not only creates an extra 
overhead, but is also susceptible to noise in the channel. Any 
interference in the channel may cause bit flipping and will 
cause the wrong time stamp to be used at the receiver for the 
Ex-OR operation in the decryption process. 
Suppose 8-bit data: 0xD5 is to be transmitted from the node 
08 with a MAC address of 0x0008000800080008 (from Table 
2) with the corresponding encryption and decryption process. 
The data first undergoes the substitution process with the S-
Box, so the substituted value after the SubBytes operation is 
03 in hexadecimal notation. The substituted value is then EX-
ORed with the last two digits of the MAC address of that node 
(which is 0x08). The resulting encrypted value to be 
transmitted is 0x0B which is 8 bit in size. The data undergo 
packetization. The packet also contains the physical address of 
the source node which is the combination of IP address and 
the MAC address of the sending node. At the receiver node 
deframing is done and the 8-bit encrypted data is EX-ORed 
with the last digits with the MAC address. In this case, the 
result is 0x03. This result is now mapped to the inverse S-Box 
table to arrive at the decrypted value of 0xD5. 
5. CONCLUSION 
With the widespread adoption of wireless sensor networks to 
monitor and gauge environmental parameters it has become 
necessary to come up with a simple yet robust security 
protocol for hardware constraint sensor nodes. The protocol 
developed was tested on the MSP430 based WiSense nodes 
and was found to be satisfactory in terms of performance and 
security. The combination of SubBytes and EX-OR provides a 
strong security against intrusion by unauthorized sources. 
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However, further optimizations can be done to provide an 
optimal, secure communication infrastructure for wireless 
sensor platforms. 
 
Table 1. Sensor Information with update times [16] 
Name  Id  Last Update  Next Update 
 0002  1 
2015-10-18 
04:04:57 - 
 0013  1 
2015-10-18 
02:03:13 
2015-10-18 
04:03:13 
 0019  4 
2015-10-18 
01:38:33 
2015-10-18 
04:38:33 
 0014  1 
2015-10-18 
01:16:00 
2015-10-18 
04:16:00 
 0005  3 
2015-10-17 
23:49:14 
2015-10-18 
00:49:14 
 0004  2 
2015-10-17 
22:38:40 
2015-10-18 
00:38:40 
 000F  2 
2015-10-17 
18:03:57 
2015-10-17 
18:08:57 
 0013  5 
2015-10-17 
17:03:04 
2015-10-17 
20:03:04 
 0006  2 
2015-10-17 
16:32:14 
2015-10-17 
17:32:14 
 0010  3 
2015-10-17 
15:48:41 
2015-10-17 
15:49:11 
 0010  2 
2015-10-17 
15:48:40 
2015-10-17 
15:50:40 
 0010  1 
2015-10-17 
15:48:40 
2015-10-17 
17:48:40 
 0004  3 
2015-10-17 
15:48:10 
2015-10-17 
16:48:10 
 0008  3 
2015-10-17 
15:48:04 
2015-10-17 
17:48:04 
 0018  2 
2015-10-17 
15:11:41 
2015-10-17 
18:11:41 
 0002  2 
2015-10-17 
12:50:35 - 
 0004  1 
2015-10-17 
12:43:50 - 
 0008  1 
2015-10-17 
09:25:46 - 
 000D  4 
2015-10-17 
09:04:03 
2015-10-17 
12:04:03 
 0017  4 
2015-10-17 
08:59:58 
2015-10-17 
09:59:58 
 0017  3 
2015-10-17 
08:59:58 
2015-10-17 
09:04:58 
 0017  1 
2015-10-17 
08:59:57 
2015-10-17 
10:59:57 
 0008  2 
2015-10-17 
08:53:28 - 
 0011  3 
2015-10-17 
07:30:49 
2015-10-17 
10:30:49 
 000D  2 
2015-10-17 
07:30:45 - 
 0006  4 
2015-10-17 
06:42:23 - 
 0012  1 
2015-10-17 
05:48:30 
2015-10-17 
05:49:00 
 0011  4 
2015-10-17 
04:38:00 
2015-10-17 
04:39:00 
 0006  3 
2015-10-17 
03:07:38 - 
 000C  3 
2015-10-17 
02:02:56 - 
 0009  1 
2015-10-17 
01:10:27 - 
 000F  6 
2015-10-17 
00:32:06 - 
 0005  2 
2015-10-16 
23:47:16 
2015-10-16 
23:48:16 
 0014  4 
2015-10-16 
23:46:03 
2015-10-16 
23:48:03 
 0019  3 
2015-10-16 
23:34:20 
2015-10-16 
23:34:50 
 0019  1 
2015-10-16 
23:34:19 
2015-10-16 
23:34:49 
 000F  5 
2015-10-16 
23:30:06 
2015-10-16 
23:32:06 
 000F  1 
2015-10-16 
23:30:04 
2015-10-16 
23:32:04 
 0014  3 
2015-10-16 
21:05:30 
2015-10-16 
21:10:30 
 0007  1 
2015-10-16 
18:47:45 
2015-10-16 
19:47:45 
 0007  4 
2015-10-16 
18:47:45 
2015-10-16 
19:47:45 
 0014  5 
2015-10-16 
17:26:13 
2015-10-16 
17:26:43 
 0016  1 
2015-10-16 
17:21:28 
2015-10-16 
17:23:28 
 000C  4 
2015-10-16 
17:12:18 
2015-10-16 
17:12:48 
 000C  2 
2015-10-16 
17:12:17 
2015-10-16 
17:17:17 
 0007  3 
2015-10-16 
16:17:19 - 
 0011  2 
2015-10-16 
15:40:15 
2015-10-16 
15:42:15 
 0018  4 
2015-10-16 
14:21:24 - 
 0007  2 
2015-10-16 
12:36:25 - 
 000D  1 
2015-10-16 
12:33:41 
2015-10-16 
13:33:41 
 000E  3 
2015-10-16 
11:40:07 
2015-10-16 
13:40:07 
 000D  3 
2015-10-16 
09:55:55 - 
 000C  1 
2015-10-16 
09:28:08 - 
 0003  1 
2015-10-16 
09:19:50 
2015-10-16 
10:19:50 
 0006  1 
2015-10-16 
08:34:04 - 
 0017  2 
2015-10-16 
07:57:38 - 
 000F  4 
2015-10-16 
07:56:27 - 
 0018  3 
2015-10-16 
07:52:37 
2015-10-16 
07:54:37 
 0018  1 
2015-10-16 
07:52:36 
2015-10-16 
07:53:36 
 000E  2 
2015-10-16 
06:23:18 
2015-10-16 
06:28:18 
 0019  2 
2015-10-16 
05:01:43 - 
 0013  3 
2015-10-16 
04:21:11 - 
 0013  2 
2015-10-16 
03:28:17 - 
 0013  4 
2015-10-16 
03:10:35 
2015-10-16 
03:11:35 
 0014  2 
2015-10-16 
03:04:01 
2015-10-16 
03:09:01 
 000F  3 
2015-10-16 
01:42:43 - 
 0011  1 
2015-10-16 
01:20:02 - 
 000E  4 
2015-10-15 
23:58:14 
2015-10-16 
00:03:14 
 000E  1 
2015-10-15 
22:50:11 - 
 0011  5 2015-10-15 2015-10-15 
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19:15:10 19:16:10 
 0005 1 
2015-10-15 
17:46:07 
2015-10-15 
18:46:07 
0005 4 
2015-10-15 
13:00:01 
2015-10-15 
5:00:01 
Table 2. Node information with location and address [16] 
 
Name Location MAC Address 
 Short 
Address 
 0002 Blk-B 0x0002000200020002 0x0002 
 0003 North Wing 0x0003000300030003 0x0003 
 0004 Corridor-B 0x0004000400040004 0x0004 
 0005 B-A 0x0005000500050005 0x0005 
 0006 South Wing 0x0006000600060006 0x0006 
 0007 Blk-A 0x0007000700070007 0x0007 
 0008 Car Park 0x0008000800080008 0x0008 
 0009 Nw Lab 0x0009000900090009 0x0009 
 000A Corridor-A 0x000A000A000A000A 0x000A 
 000B South Wing 0x000B000B000B000B 0x000B 
 000C South Wing 0x000C000C000C000C 0x000C 
 000D Blk-B 0x000D000D000D000D 0x000D 
 000E South Wing 0x000E000E000E000E 0x000E 
 000F Blk-B 0x000F000F000F000F 0x000F 
 0010 North Wing 0x0010001000100010 0x0010 
 0011 North Wing 0x0011001100110011 0x0011 
 0012 Corridor-B 0x0012001200120012 0x0012 
 0013 Blk-A 0x0013001300130013 0x0013 
 0014 Nw Lab 0x0014001400140014 0x0014 
 0015 Nw Lab 0x0015001500150015 0x0015 
 0016 Corridor-A 0x0016001600160016 0x0016 
 0017 ECE Dept 0x0017001700170017 0x0017 
 0018 Nw Lab 0x0018001800180018 0x0018 
 0019 Corridor-B 0x0019001900190019 0x0019 
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